Agenda

PhD defense Pierre-François Darlas: Digital Platforms Strategies and Regulation: Essays in Industrial Organization

Tuesday, 03 December, 2024 at 10.00 (Paris time) at Télécom Paris

Télécom Paris, 19 place Marguerite Perey F-91120 Palaiseau [getting there], amphi Rose Dieng and in videoconferencing

Jury

  • Alexandre de Cornière, Professor, Toulouse School of Economics, France (Referee)
  • Axel Gautier, Professor, HEC Liège, Belgium (Referee)
  • Grazia Cecere, Professor, IMT Business School, France (Examiner)
  • Thibaud Vergé, Vice-president, Autorité de la concurrence, France (Examiner)
  • Marie-Laure Allain, Professor, CREST, CNRS, École Polytechnique, France (Co-supervisor)
  • Marc Bourreau, Professor, Télécom Paris, France (Co-supervisor)

Abstract

This thesis focuses on market power in digital markets. It aims at providing insights to policy makers, by allowing them to understand digital platforms’ strategies and their impact on market outcomes.

Suite
The first chapter theoretically examines platforms’ business model decisions, and their impact on innovation. In equilibrium, platforms can differentiate in business model, potentially allowing them to innovate more thanks to a Schumpeterian effect of business model differentiation. We identify that business model can be a source of distortion, and that policy makers should take it into account in attempting to design innovation stimulating policies.
The second chapter theoretically studies the adtech stack contestability. Its results indicate that vertical integration between an incumbent adtech stack with a downstream display advertising platforms (e.g. Google and YouTube) is a way to successfully reduce adtech contestability. I discuss the efficiency of online advertising restrictions, in the spirit of European Union TV regulations, in tackling issues related to such integration and protecting end users from excessive exposure to online advertising.
The third chapter empirically inspects the effect of products value assessment information provision by online auction platforms. Our findings indicate that, holding intrinsic object value constant, higher experts estimates increase buyers valuation for the good. Despite potential conflicts of interest stemming from the platform’s dual role as matchmaker and advisor, our results show that expert estimates are influential even when potentially overinflated. This study underscores the critical role of platform-provided information in enhancing market efficiency.